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Inertia and Change in the Early Years: 
Employment Relations in Young, High 
Technology Firms 
MICHAEL T. HANNAN, M. DIANE BURTON, 
JAMES N. BARON 
(Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, Stanford CA 94305-5015, USA) 
This paper considers processes of organizational imprinting in a sample of 100 young, 
high technology companies. It examines the effects of a pair of initial conditions: the 
founders' models of the employment relation and their business strategies. Our analyses 
indicate that these two features were well aligned when the firms were founded How-
ever, the alignment has deteriorated over time, due to changes in the distribution of 
employment models. In particular, the 'star' model and 'commitment' model are less 
stable than the 'engineering' model and the 'factory' model. Despite their instability, 
these two blueprints for the employment relation have strong effects in shaping the 
early evolution of these firms. In particular, firms that embark with these models have 
significantly higher rates of replacing the founder chief executive with a non-founder 
as well as higher rates of completing an initial public stock offering. Some implica-
tions of these findings for future studies of imprinting and inertia in organizations are 
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~ 1. Imprinting, Inertia and Organizational Change 
J How much do origins matter for organizations? This question has pivotal 
„ importance for understanding organizational change. Despite its theoretical 
| importance, little effort has been directed at gaining evidence that speaks 
£ directly to it. This paper takes a first step in an effort to rectify this gap in 
h our knowledge. It reports some early results from an effort to examine pro-
f$ cesses of imprinting in a sample of young, high technology companies. Current theory and research on organizations and industries reflect two ^ polar views on the importance of origins. One perspective holds that organ* 
•j izational structures reflect mainly current internal and external exigencies: 
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core technology (Thompson, 1967), the structure of transaction costs 
(Williamson, 1975, 1981), and cultural rules about organizing (Meyer and 
Rowan, 1977). This view builds on the (usually tacit) assumption that struc-
tural change by organizations is unproblematic and relatively free of friction. 
Lack of friction causes origins (and the past, more generally) to become irrel-
evant as time passes and internal and external challenges change. Conse-
quently, looking to origins should not help explain structure, once the 
present set of constraints has been taken into account. 
The other pole in the debate holds that origins matter a great deal: origin 
conditions become imprinted on organizations, and these imprints have 
enduring importance (Stinchcombe, 1965; Hannan and Freeman, 1977). 
Although organizations might subsequently change as the challenges and 
opportunities change, initial conditions limit the scope of subsequent 
changes. This view builds on the assumption of strong hysterisis or path 
dependence in organizational change. 
Although the possible enduring effects of origins have important substan-
tive implications, they have been the subject of surprisingly little empirical 
investigation. Researchers have sought to infer answers to questions about 
hysterisis in organizational structure by examining organizational mortality 
schedules under a variety of potentially relevant conditions. For instance, 
Carroll and Hannan (1989) report that environmental conditions at found-
ing have lasting effects on organizations. Specifically, the density of organ-
izations in a population at the time of an organization's founding, which is 
assumed to capture the intensity of competition, affects its lifetime mortality 
schedule.1 Most recent research on the inertia hypothesis has concentrated 
on testing Hannan and Freeman's (1984) hypothesis that change in core 
structures increases the hazard of mortality by reducing the advantages of 
accrued experience.2 However, few researchers have had access to detailed in-
formation on the early activities of a set of organizations and on subsequent 
developments. Hence, we lack a clear image of the processes involved. 
Historical treatments of industries and organizations document extensive 
change over centuries and often over much briefer spans of time. Many of 
today's well-recognized industries and organizational populations did not 
exist a century ago; indeed, many did not exist even a quarter of a century 
ago. Even those industries and organizational, populations whose origins date 
to earlier centuries have undergone extensive renovations, with many organ-
1
 This result has turned out to be extremely robust (Hannan and Carroll, 1992), suggesting that com-
petitive conditions at the time of an organization's inception do have long lasting effects for diverse 
organizational populations. 
2
 Well-designed research on this issue reveals that the effects of structural change vary with organiza-
tional age. The older an organization, the greater the resulting increase in the mortality rate (Amburgey 
tt ml., 1993; Bamett and Carroll. 199); CarroU and Teo. 1996). 
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izational actors coming and going and industry and population structures 
being altered greatly. The leading organizations and organizational forms in 
one era seldom manage to retain their lofty positions—or even to survive— 
when technological, social and economic structures change sharply. In each 
era, upstart organizations and organizational forms rise to prominence. In 
the very long run (i.e. a time-scale of centuries), it seems hard to dispute 
that industries and other organizational worlds change by a process of selection 
in the sense of differential replacement. 
What about shorter time-scales—say, decades? Here the picture becomes 
unclear. Much organization theory in sociology and economics has held that 
organizational change over such periods reflects mainly adaptive change by 
existing organizations. In this view, organizations remake themselves when 
the times demand it. Nelson and Winter (1982) draw the resemblance 
between this view and the Lamarckian position in evolutionary biology. 
Beginning in the late 1970s, organizational ecologists proposed a selec-
tionist account of organizational change (Hannan and Freeman, 1977, 
1989). In this perspective, individual organizations are seen as incorporating 
features of the prevailing social and economic environment at their time of 
founding. Initial structures (especially those that are most central—see 
below) are thought to be subject to strong inertial forces: Therefore, individ-
ual organizations have limited capacities to reshape themselves quickly 
when environmental changes pose challenges to their continued growth and 
survival. Limits on the speed of adaptation at the organizational level create 
the conditions for rival to emerge and flourish. Inertia at the organizational 
level allows evolution at the population level.3 
Doubtless, both adaptive change at the organizational level and selection at 
the organizational population level characterize many situations of interest. 
There is much current interest in building models that combine these pro-
cesses. However, such an integration might be premature because we lack a 
clear understanding of some key features of the underlying processes. There 
continues to be value in clarifying adaptation and selection stories. Doing so 
focuses attention on several issues. 
First, there is the issue of change versus adaptation. Discussions of these 
issues often focus merely on the frequency of change. If observations on a set 
of organizations reveal that structures and procedures have been altered, 
then it is argued that the ecological perspective does not apply. But this 
i
 March (1991) develops an alternative scenario in which organizational learning (a central component 
of any purposeful adaptation story) can produce the tame remit. When a set of organization! specialize 
their teaming along certain paths (an 'exploitation' strategy), they become more and more narrowly spe-
cialized and lea capable of teaming about other regions of the strategy space. Such specialized adaptation 
opens the possibility that sen of organisations using a mote generalized search strategy ('exploration') can 
gain a foothold and dime. 
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kind of reasoning misses the central point about adaptation. The fact that 
organizations sometimes change their structures does not, by itself, vitiate a 
selection argument. Successful adaptation requires that organizations be able 
to (i) choose the 'right' structural change; and (ii) time its implementation 
correctly in response to the vagaries of their shifting environments. Hannan 
and Freeman (1984) argued that the worst case is to incur the costs of re-
organization only to find, once the new structure has been put in place, that 
the environment has changed to a configuration that demands further re-
organization. 
Any useful treatment of organizational inertia must, therefore, go beyond 
debates about whether organizations change. Instead, research ought frame 
the issues in relative terms, comparing the characteristic speeds of organiza-
tional transformation and environmental change. The ecological perspective 
holds most strongly when environments can change more quickly than 
organizations can remake themselves. Unfortunately, little effort has been 
made to calibrate these speeds for any interesting cases. This is a major gap 
in our understanding. 
The second challenge in sorting out adaptationist and selectionist 
accounts of organizational change concerns the multifaceted nature of organ-
izations. What features of structure ought to be considered? Some aspects of 
even the stodgiest organizations change almost continuously. Consider the 
contemporary US research university. The detailed profile of the organiza-
tion's research activity changes by the hour, as some experiments end, others 
begin, and so forth. The case of characters changes on a time-scale of 
months, as employees and students come and go. The organizational structure 
changes on a time-scale of years, as institutes and departments are created, 
merged, or closed. Key features of the employment relation for the pro-
fessoriate, such as the institution of tenure for senior faculty, change on a 
time-scale of centuries. Whether such organizations are considered highly 
adaptive depends overwhelmingly on one's focus. 
The common device for sorting out these myriad features of organizations 
relies on a core-periphery imagery. In this view, a feature forms part of the 
organizational 'core' if changing it requires adjustments in most other fea-
tures of the enterprise. A feature lies at the periphery if it can be changed 
without imposing changes on other features. In this view, coreness means 
connectedness, elements in the core are linked in complicated webs of re-
lations with each other and with peripheral elements.4 Because dense webs 
4
 h might be useful to pumie the parallels btmcca treatments of inertia in organitscional ecology 
with Kanffman'a (1993) NK models. Thcae models cbaacterize the evolution of a system over e fitness 
' " " * T » (• mapping of conf\gunuions to fitness). The evolving unit is specified as a linked set of compo-
nents. N denotes the number of components and K denotes the per-component number of linkages. 
KautBnan's analyses and simulations reveal that the ratio of IT GO N determines the topography of the 
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of connections retard change, core features are more inert than peripheral 
ones (Hannan and Freeman, 1984). 
Although there seems to be general agreement that some organizational 
features fall nearer the core than others, we see no consensus on exactly what 
constitutes the core. We suggest that research ought to measure connections 
directly and estimate the impacts of change in some features on the rate of 
change in others. In addition, attention to the sequence and timing of the 
adoption of structures and practices might help specify the composition of 
the core and how it varies across different types of organizations. There is a 
fundamental asymmetry based upon 'time's arrow'. Features adopted early in 
an organization's life can affect which structures and practices it adopts sub-
sequently, but later events do not shape earlier ones. Consequently, the 
structures adopted in the process of initial organization-building are likely 
to have the broadest and longest-lived consequences—to be most core-like. 
Imprinting refers to a process by which events occurring at certain key 
developmental stages have persisting, if not lifelong, consequences. The idea 
that organizations tend to imprint their founding conditions comes from 
Stinchcombe's (1965) elaboration of Max Weber's account of the logic of 
organization building. Stinchcombe argued that social and economic struc-
tures have their maximal impact on emerging organizations. Entrepreneurs 
must divert financial and human capital from other uses in order to build 
organizations. The process of mobilizing the two kinds of capital exposes 
their plans to intense scrutiny. Their proposals are tested against conven-
tional wisdoms and taken-for-granted assumptions about organizations and 
employment. Because conventional wisdoms and taken-for-granted assump-
tions change over historical time (as new forms of organization flourish and 
others wane), the tests imposed on proto-organization also change. Con-
sequently, the kinds of organizations that emerge in any era reflect the 
character of the founding period. 
Imprinting requires two conditions. First, there must be an initial mapping 
of some external condition on the nascent organization (as suggested in the 
foregoing). Second, the imprinted characteristics must be fairly inert, other-
wise, subsequent change will erode the association of founding conditions 
landscape. At tow K/N, the landscape it smooch and has few peaks. Random search has a high probability 
of locating the configurations of maximal fitness. Average paths of search are long, because the smooth-
ness of the landscape means that there are few chasms that end the lifetime and thus the search. There-
fore, evolution resembles ordinary hill climbing search. Search appears to be adaptive. At high K/N, the 
landarapr is rugged, with many local peaks separated by regions of very low fitness. Random search tends 
to get caught in the local peaks. Searches that entail long-distance moves end with high likelihood in the 
low fitness chasms. In this scenario, inertia is the rule for long-lived systems, because those whose ran-
dom search moved them some significant distance in the metric of configurations will be unlikely, to have 
survived. Therefore, there is a connection between density of connections among components (K/N) and 
inertia. 
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and organizational features. It is this second condition that makes notions of 
imprinting central to treatments of organizational change. Evidence of 
imprinting provides indirect evidence of strong-form (absolute) structural 
inertia. 
In arguing for imprinting, Stinchcombe (1965, 1979) focused on the 
employment relation. Lacking comparative data on firms, he made the argu-
ment at the level of industries. He noted that industries formed in different 
centuries still reflect today some of the character of their formative periods. 
For instance, industries formed after the 'organizational revolution' during 
the closing years of the 19th century and the early years of the 20th century 
typically employ a higher fraction of administrative workers than those with 
earlier origins.5 
If Stinchcombe is right, then certain features of the employment relation 
are likely to be imprinted. Moreover, the character of the employment re-
lation gets set, at least implicitly, very early in the organization's existence: 
when the first employees arrive and later when jobs are formalized. Arrange-
ments made at that time might have long-lasting consequences. As Baron 
and Kreps (in press) argue, emerging organizations might need to commit 
to a stable pattern of employment relations in order to build a reputation in 
the labor market that will facilitate the attraction and retention of valuable 
employees. 
In the only research that we know that bears on these issues, Baron and 
colleagues investigated inertia in employment systems in agencies of the 
California state government. Baron and Newman (1990) analyzed the inter-
actions of age of a job category and characteristics of its incumbents on its 
prescribed pay rate. They found that jobs with mainly female incumbents 
tended to have lower prescribed pay rates and that this effect increased 
significantly with the age of the job. Baron and Newman (1990, p. 172) 
interpret this effect as indicating that 'notions of imprinting and inertia 
thus might fruitfully be extended to the study of work roles: cohorts of jobs 
founded during the same period might be expected to evince common 
features, such as shared selection and promotion criteria and similar degrees 
of ascription'. 
It also turned out that organizational age affected the rate at which gender 
composition of jobs changed in response to changing composition of the rel-
evant work-force. Baron et al. (1991) report that the youngest and oldest 
state agencies integrated their work-forces more quickly than agencies of 
intermediate age. They interpret the effect for younger jobs as agreeing with 
' Carroll and Mayer (1986) used Stinchcombe'! historical typology of employment systems in indus-
trial sectors in analyzing patterns of individual careers. They found that time of origin of industry affects 
mobility regimes centuries and decades after rounding. 
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the idea that inertial pressures on youthful structures are weaker than on 
older ones. The effect for the oldest agencies is harder to understand. Baron 
and colleagues suggest that this effect reflects the survivor bias in their data 
the set of very old jobs is unusual in having survived for a long time and are 
therefore perhaps more responsive to environmental pressures). These studies 
make clear that age matters for the employment relationship and that the 
observed patterns are consistent with the hypothesis of age-dependent inertia 
in organizational structures and practices. However, the research design 
(with its survivor bias) precludes a sharp analysis of the processes by which 
jobs and organizations become fixed in certain configurations. 
Lack of clarity about the underlying processes is a problem generally in 
current theories of organizational change. Consider, for instance, the timing 
of imprinting processes. If structures become fixed, when does this happen? 
Existing research focuses largely on the time of founding, following Stinch-
combe's lead. Although imprinting plausibly reflects the conditions under 
which human and financial capital are mobilized, it is not obvious that lock-
in occurs so early in organizational lifetimes. Close examination of the early 
days in organizational lifetimes suggests much learning by doing and seem-
ingly random search for procedures and structures. Moreover, many founders 
eschew rules and formal structures initially and attempt to coordinate action 
by holding frequent meetings of the entire membership. Under such con-
ditions, the organization might move flexibly among alternative ways of 
organizing. However, successful organizations inevitably outgrow this mode 
of coordination. Perhaps lock-in processes operate strongly at the time that 
organizational and job structures are first formalized, when positions and roles 
get defined impersonally (without reference to the identities of incumbents) 
and patterns of ties among jobs are set in place. That is, an alternative view 
on imprinting holds that the 'clock' refers not to organizational age per se 
but instead to the intensity of formalization. A third possibility, which 
seems particularly germane to the case of firms begun by technologists, is 
that lock-in takes place after the transition to professional management. Dis-
criminating among these (and perhaps other) scenarios would reveal much 
about the sources and likely consequences of imprinting. 
We take advantage of a newly available set of data to begin to address 
these issues empirically. Our companion paper (Baron et al., 1996) examines 
the origins of employment relations in a set of 100 young high technology 
firms in Silicon Valley. It seeks to describe how these firms varied in their 
initial blueprints for the employment relations, emphasizing consistency and 
In inieivicwt, founders of the firm* in our study, which ii described below, often tepuned that a sig-
nificant change in their organiwion's character can be traced to the period in which their work-force 
outgrew the company's largest meeting room. 
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complementarities among dimensions of human resource management and how 
founders' employment models shaped the early evolution of human resource 
policies and practices. This paper takes the second step, exploring the broader 
organizational implications of founders' initial blueprints. The analysis, which 
seeks to contribute to our understanding of how and why origins might matter, 
has two parts. The first addresses the extent and causes of changes in employ-
ment models over the early years. The second examines some implications of 
the initial blueprints for early development of these firms. 
2. Research Design 
This analysis, like that reported by Baron et al. (1996), uses data on the 100 
firms studied in the first stage of the Stanford Project on Emerging Com-
panies (SPEC). These firms constitute a stratified random sample of young 
high technology firms in Silicon Valley (defined as the part of the San Francisco 
peninsula from the San Francisco airport to San Jose). The sample comes 
from the population of firms that were reported as having been founded no 
earlier than 1984 and as having 10 or more employees in 1994.7 
Our project team conducted interviews with founders, current chief 
executive officers (CEOs), and senior managers with responsibility for 
human resources. From founders we acquired information about the firm's 
early years. CEOs reported on current conditions and near-term prospects. 
Senior managers with oversight of human resources (HR) provided detailed 
information about changes in diverse features of the employment relation 
over the firm's history. 
We intend to follow these firms over time. Current plans call for re-
interviews in 1996 and 1999, which will enable us to relate early organ-
izational histories to subsequent outcomes, including survival, performance, 
and changes in the work-force. We optimized this design for studying 
changes from 1994 forward. Therefore, the most dependable answers to 
questions about change for these firms lie several years in the future. 
In the interim, we take advantage of the retrospective histories of the 
SPEC firms to address issues of stability and change among an unusual 
sample of firms. The retrospective data in hand, although not optimal, do 
paint a potentially interesting picture of patterns of change over the early 
years for 100 £rms. Moreover, we have taken pains to obtain precise infor-
mation on changes in the firm over its lifetime. This information allows us 
to examine the sequencing of changes and to estimate continuous-time 
stochastic models of change. 
7
 In a (em cases che sources turned out to be inaccurate. The oldest firm in our sample actually began 
business in 1982. 
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Nonetheless, we must emphasize that the cross-section of firms studied in 
mid-1994 comes from a 'survivor-biased' sample.8 That his, we have 
sampled survivors from the birth cohorts of 1984, 1985, etc. This means 
that we cannot use these data to analyze the determinants of success (because 
we have 'sampled on this dependent variable'). Moreover, it means that 
effects of age on other outcomes do not have unambiguous interpretation as 
effects of aging. Instead, age tells both about aging and about the likelihood 
of having survived for a certain duration. These and other potential limita-
tions of the research design, which are discussed in the companion paper 
(Baron et al.y 1996) should be kept in mind in considering the results we 
present. 
The median firm in our sample was roughly 6.5 years when visited in the 
summer of 1994. Thus, our 100 firms provide roughly 650 firm-years in the 
presumably crucial formative life cycle stage. The range on age in the 
sample runs from 2 to 12 years (one firm turned out to be older than we 
thought). 
This age distribution differs substantially from samples of organizations 
typically studied by economists and sociologists. Because the firms in SPEC 
are much younger than the population of comparably large firms, we expect 
change to be more fluid—virtually all of the well-designed research on the 
subject finds that rates of structural change decline with age (Barnett and 
Carroll, 1995). On the other hand, youth means that origins are recent. 
Hence, we would expect that origins would matter more in the SPEC 
sample than in the full population. More precisely, origins ought to be more 
highly correlated with current conditions for younger organizations, making 
it more difficult to distinguish the effects of the two sets of conditions. 
The industrial environments facing these firms change rapidly. The firms 
in our sample are concentrated in several broad sectors of high technology: 
computer hardware and software, telecommunications and networking, and 
medical technologies and biotechnology. These high technology sectors 
experience rapid turnover in organizational composition. Rates of founding, 
acquisition, merger and bankruptcy are all high. The competitive landscape 
changes rapidly and nearly continuously—a firm's rivals today often differ 
markedly from those it faced only a year ago. Moreover, the velocity of 
change in product characteristics is also high. Thus, timeliness in develop-
ing and introducing new products makes an enormous difference for survival 
and profitability. Finally, environmental volatility is amplified by a lack of 
clarity of the boundaries between industries and their segments. That is, the 
boundaries demarcating high technology industries are faint and mutable 
* If is perhaps worth noting that studio of organizations in economics and sociology routinely analyse 
such samples without acknowledging the threat to valid inference arising from the nature of the design. 
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over short time spans. Frequently, a firm's set of potential rivals cannot be 
bounded usefully by conventional definitions of industry.9 
When environments are so volatile, even moderate brakes on the pace of 
structural change have important consequences. That is, the environments 
are moving so rapidly that only extremely rapid change can maintain close 
alignment of organizations and environments. The high level of environ-
mental volatility also means that one can gain a great deal of information 
about issues of inertia and change from relatively brief spans of observation. 
3. Models of Employment and Business Strategies 
As noted above, theories of organizational change usually assume that those 
structural features and practices closest the organization's core face the 
strongest inertial force. This analysis builds on the premise that systems of 
employment relations and competitive strategy lie at the core. As we noted 
in the previous section, entrepreneurs enact an employment system, some-
times self-consciously and sometimes by default, in mobilizing financial 
resources to begin firms and in staffing their organizations, entrepreneurs 
commit to strategies, and these commitments impose binding constraints on 
subsequent actions. Business strategies, like employment systems, build 
commitments that are costly to change. 
Models of the Employment Relation 
As discussed in detail in the companion paper, we asked founders whether 
they initially planned to follow any model or blueprint in building their 
organizations and establishing a set of employment relations. As Burton 
(1993) and Baron et al. (1996) detail, we classified these responses according 
to what we regarded as the underlying images of the employment relation 
they reflected. We found that founders' conceptions varied along three 
dimensions. The first concerns the nature of the attachment between the employee 
and the firm. Three images dominate here: (i) long-term commitment (the 
firm as 'family'), (ii) ties based on the nature of the work—the opportunity 
to work on interesting and challenging work ('cool technology'), and (iii) 
pecuniary compensation (the employment relationship is primarily a monetary 
one). The second dimension refers to images of coonUnation and control of 
work. The dominant images of coordination include (i) managerial control 
with monitoring, (ii) peer and cultural control (where the employees have 
extensive control over the means by which work gets done but little control 
' One founder of a firm in manufacturing networking products intiwrd that this industry lacks dear 
boundaries. When we asked him to name his most salient competitors, he replied 'Everyone'. 
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over strategic directions, projects to be pursued, etc.), and (iii) delegation to 
professionals of the right to influence strongly both the way in which work 
gets done and the larger strategic directions shaping the work. The third 
dimension pertains to the firm's primary emphasis in recruiting and selecting 
employees. The respondents tended to describe themselves as seeking primarily 
either: (i) bundles of demonstrable skills, (ii) stars and/or potential stars ('the 
best and the brightest'), or (iii) persons with strong fit to the organizational 
culture and a team orientation. 
Of the 33 possible combinations of these categories, four predominate in 
the firms in which we conducted interviews. We refer to these four as the 
models or blueprints of the employment relation. They are: 
• Factory model: pecuniary attachment,, managerial control, hire for current 
skills; 
• Commitment model: attachment based upon 'love', peer/cultural control, 
hire for cultural fit (all with a view to long-term employment); 
• Star model: attachment to work, professional control, hire for potential; 
• Engineering model: attachment to work (and to a project), peer control, hire 
for current skills (the taken-for-granted Silicon Valley model). 
4. Sources of Variation in Founders' Employment Models 
The mere existence of such diverse models among such a relatively restricted 
sample of organizations is itself interesting; Most sociological and economic 
theories of organizations suggest that organizations engaged in the same 
activities and utilizing the same productive resources should organize and 
manage their human resources similarly. Admittedly, the firms in our high 
technology sample are doing different things—searching for biotechnological 
breakthroughs, fabricating computer components, writing software, etc. but 
they, are rather similar in their technologies, certainly relative to the econ-
omy as a whole. Moreover, we encounter startling diversity in founders' 
employment models even among start-up companies within the very same 
industry, competing directly against one another. 
For example, several of the SPEC firms are working on developing com-
puter operating systems. One of these firms exhibits a clear star model. They 
are extremely selective in their recruiting practices and require candidates to 
go through as many as 10 interviews. The culture was described as 'per-
fectionist', with every employee expected to make significant contributions. 
A competing firm, also in our sample, has a very different view of employees 
and the employment relationship. The CEO described his model as 'paternal-
istic'. He further described how he is opposed to the standard Silicon Valley 
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mentality of 'treating people as commodities' and went on to describe all of 
the ways that his firm cultivates and develops employees. Yet a third firm in 
our sample, engaged in the same business, espouses a standard engineering 
model and relies exclusively on the attractiveness of their technology to 
recruit, motivate and retain employees. 
Moreover, note that our sample, by design, controls for a number of the 
main sources of variation in employment systems that would be attended to 
by various theories from economics and sociology. For instance, all the firms 
in our sample have their headquarters in Silicon Valley, representing a com-
mon set of labor markets and regulatory regime. They are all new, small 
companies engaged in technology-related activities. Most of the founders 
have worked previously in other ventures within the Valley and are therefore 
well aware of what the prototypical Silicon Valley start-up is 'supposed' to 
look like. Indeed, not infrequently we encountered the same established 
organization—such as Hewlett Packard, DEC, IBM, Apple and Oracle— 
serving as a model to be emulated for some rounders in our sample and as a 
model to be avoided for others. Also of interest is the fact that occasionally 
founders cited models emanating from very different industries, such as the 
software company that cited Ben and Jerry's (ice cream) as its positive 
model. 
What factors, then, account for the variations we observe in founders' 
employment models? We are currently exploring this issue in depth, including 
an examination of the role that the founders, their biographies, prior re-
lationships (if any), and ties to external partners (such as venture capitalists, 
lawyers, consultants and the like) play in shaping the blueprint for human 
resources management (for preliminary results, see Burton, 1995). 
Business Strategies 
One obvious factor that is especially likely to shape the blueprint for the 
employment relation is founders' intended business strategies. Like initial 
employment systems, choice of initial business strategy entails commit-
ments both inside and outside the organization. Because both employees and 
external partners make investment decisions based on announced strategic 
directions, change in strategy imposes costs on them and they can be 
expected to resist such changes. In other words, basic features of business 
strategies ought to be difficult to change. 
Moreover, there are reasons for thinking that employment models and 
business strategies are highly interdependent. The claim that employment 
practices should be closely aligned with and supportive of business strategy 
is the mainstay of the field of strategic human resource management (e.g. 
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Sonnenfeld and Peiperl, 1988; Legnick-Hall and Legnick-Hall, 1988). Cer-
tainly, business strategy bears directly on transaction cost concerns that 
affect the optimal organization of work and employment. For instance, 
within our sample, some companies are 'born' with fully-formed products, 
whereas founders of other companies (e.g. biotechnology start-ups) have only 
the vaguest notion ar the firm's inception of what the end produces) of their 
research and development activities will be. In the latter case, this time lag 
between founding the company and having developed a commercializable 
product that can secure regulatory approval and be marketed, coupled with 
the highly proprietary nature of the technology involved, presumably gives 
the employer a strong incentive to bind the interest of key employees to the 
firm over the long term. 
Above it was argued that tight connectedness among a set of organ-
izational features makes them part of the organization's core, the part of the 
organization that is most resistent to change. If business strategy and 
employment systems turn out to be highly interdependent, then we ought 
to expect both to be affected by initial conditions, that is, to be imprinted. 
Thus, we examine the relationship between employment models and busi-
ness strategies over the early years for the firms in the SPEC sample in some 
detail. 
To investigate the relationship between founders' employment models 
and intended business strategy, we classified firms into a series of categories 
describing their dominant strategic focus. This classification was based on 
content analyses of the founder interviews, supplemented (in some cases) by 
secondary sources (e.g. newspaper articles and industry analysts' reports) 
and/or other materials provided by the firm (e.g. a business plan). Coders 
were asked to discern from available materials what the founders) en-
visioned as their source(s) of ability to succeed in the face of competition in 
the product market. As in the case of the employment models, we en-
countered many different responses (and combinations of responses) from 
founders, but descriptions of their presumed distinctive competence tended 
to cluster into several major categories.10 
(i) Technological Leadership: These firms seek to gain first-mover advantages 
by winning a technology race. Often, this means gaining a crucial patent or 
set of patents. The emphasis here is on breakthrough technology. Illustrative 
quotations from interviews with founders of firms classified in this category 
include 'Founders of [firm] had found a technical solution that worked for 
a problem that the world didn't even realize they had'. The basic core 
competence of the firm was the patented technology for the first complete 
micro-valve that used a silicon chip for fluid pressure/flow regulation.' Of 
10
 For BOOK details, tee Bunon (1993). 
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the 100 firms in our sample, 44 were classified as being in this category, 
which is not surprising given the industries we studied. 
(ii) Enhancement of Existing Technology: These firms seek to produce a product 
similar to other companies, but they employ some general modification to 
the technology to gain competitive advantage. Distinctive competencies can 
include system integration (e.g. of software and hardware), superior quality 
(in terms of dependability or availability of features desired by customers), 
and the like. Interview transcripts from firms classified into this category 
included the following examples: '{TJhey knew that there was a market for 
optical character recognition and they wanted to outperform their existing 
competitors on accuracy and speed. It was a 'me-too approach'.' '[Our] com-
petitive advantage is [in] providing both hardware and software expertise . . . 
[Our] product is the most feature-rich in the industry.' Eighteen firms were 
classified as being in this category.11 
(ii) Superior Marketing andJor Customer Service: Firms in this category seek 
competitive advantage through developing or exploiting superior relations 
with customers, achieved through custom design of products, branding, 
using non-standard methods of sales or distribution, or simply by develop-
ing superior capabilities in marketing, sales, and customer service. Here are 
a few illustrative excerpts from interview transcripts of firms classified in 
this category: 'We're pretty sharp at understanding our customers' require-
ments before they even knew they had them. We foresee requirements, 
invest in them, and then deliver a product that people want.' In another 
company, the strategy consisted of: 'creating a second label . . . creating a 
strong second source to Microsoft [by offering] superior sales and market-
ing.' In a third, the founders '[built their] own distribution system, which 
almost none of [their] competitors has'. In a number of companies, the strat-
egy consisted of creating products that respond directly to customers' 
idiosyncratic needs, often working interactively with customers toward that 
end. Twelve firms were classified as having strategies driven by marketing, 
sales, and/or service. 
(iv) Technology-Marketing Hybrid [(iii) combined with either (i) or (ii)]: 
Another 13 firms combined a marketing-service focus with an emphasis 
either on enhancing an existing technology or on technological leadership. 
Not surprisingly, most of these hybrids (11 or the 13 firms) involved a com-
bination of a marketing or service orientation with efforts to enhance an 
existing technology (by catering to specific customer needs). 
(v) Cost-Minimization: Firms in this category seek cost advantages through 
superior production techniques, economies of scale, and the like. '[Firm] 
11
 Two finns in which the distinctive competencies included both technological leadership and tech-
nological enhancement woe categorized a* being in the Technological leadership category. 
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began as an IBM PS/2 clone maker . . . [they] knew they could build sys-
tems more cheaply than IBM.' The founder was frustrated at his previous 
company with the cost of boards and knew they could be produced more 
cheaply.' Three firms were classified as having a pure cost strategy. Another 
four combined a focus on cost minimization with some other focus (gener-
ally marketing or service) and were included in this category as well.12 
Alignment of Strategies and Employment Models at Founding 
Table 1 cross-tabulates founders' strategies and employment models. The 
association between the two is quite striking (X2 = 32.9, df= \2,p < 0.01). 
Not surprisingly, founders intending to pursue a strategy of cost-
minimization also were likely to champion the factory model of employment: 
two-thirds of firms pursuing a cost strategy espoused this employment 
model, compared to 7.8% of the technology leaders, 12.5% of the technol-
ogy enhancers, 8.3% of those pursuing a marketing-service strategy, and 
7.7% of the technology-marketing hybrid firms. 
As we would expect, the star model is espoused most frequently among 
founders embracing a strategy of technological leadership: 39-5% of that 
group were classified as belonging to the star category, followed by 33% for 
those pursuing a marketing or service orientation and 31.3% for those plan-
ning on enhancing an existing technology. None of the firms pursuing a 
'hybrid' strategy or a cost-minimization strategy was classified as being in 
the star model category. The comments of one founder, drawing on the 
scholarly contrast between 'theory X' (industrial engineering, Taylorist) and 
'theory Y* (self-actualization, employee development) approaches to manage-
T A B U 1. Relationship of Strategy and Employment Model at Founding 
Founder's HR model 
Factory 
Commitment 
Scar 
Engineering 
Total 
T 
3 
6 
15 
14 
38 
45% 
E 
2 
5 
5 
4 
16 
19% 
Founder's strategy 
M H 
1 1 
6 6 
4 0 
1 6 
12 13 
14% 15% 
C 
4 
2 
0 
0 
6 
7% 
Total 
11(13%) 
25(29%) 
24(28%) 
25(29%) 
85 
100% 
Pc»noa»X2- }2$,4- I2,p < 0.001. 
11
 We chained any strategy mentioning tow costs a» a distinctive competence into this category, eren 
if the founder also enumerated some other competence(s), under the assumption that firm* combining 
low costs with a marketing focus were more likely to resemble the pure cost minimixers than to resemble 
the marketing-driven firms that are serving idiosyncratic customer needs, engaging in concurrent engi-
neering, and the like. 
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ment, provides a clear rationale for why the star model does not mesh well 
with a strategy centered around cost minimization: 
I set out to build a Y-type company, not an X-type. I wanted people who 
believed in the technology and were self-motivated. I realized after starting, 
however, that the reality of a bootstrap environment is that you can't afford 
the people who fit a Y environment. You have to settle for lower salaried 
people and drive them X-style. This 'settling for less' is also driven in pan 
by greed. I simply don't want to give up the [stock} options it would take 
to get a high caliber person. 
Technological leadership also appears to fit the engineering model of 
employment, which was espoused by 36.8% of founders intending to pursue 
that strategy. The engineering model is even more prevalent among firms 
that intended to combine technological and marketing-service competencies, 
espoused by 46.2% of founders whose firms are in the hybrid strategy category. 
The engineering model is also prevalent among the firms that planned to 
enhance an existing technology (25%). The popularity of this model within 
every category involving an emphasis on technology is hardly surprising, 
given that the engineering model of employment is the default or taken-
for-granted conception within the Silicon Valley technical community. 
Finally, it is interesting that the commitment model is most prevalent 
among firms pursuing a pure marketing-service strategy (50%), followed 
closely by those planning on combining technological and marketing com-
petencies (46.2%). Presumably, companies that plan on sustaining their 
competitive advantage through long-term cooperative relations with cus-
tomers and clients put a higher premium on long-term cooperative relations 
with their employees as well. These firms depend critically on the relation-
ships that develop between their employees and the firm's long-term cus-
tomers; those relationships represent valuable firm-specific investments, 
which are costly to replace and which the firm therefore seeks to protect by 
binding employees to the firm long-term. Those relationships also represent 
costly firm-specific investments to employees, creating an interest in long-
term attachments on their part. Baron et al. (1996) report that firms built 
around the commitment model were also the fastest to adopt profit-sharing 
or gain-sharing, which ties employees' compensation to long-term overall 
company performance. 
Just under a third (31.3%) of founders whose intended strategy was one 
of technological enhancement also championed the commitment model, 
compared to only 15.8% of those who intended to compete through techno-
logical leadership. Put differently, we find that founders planning on 
enhancing existing technologies are fairly evenly divided among the com-
mitment, engineering and star models, with 12.5% even espousing a factory 
518 
Inertia and Change in the Early Years 
TABLE 2. Stability and Change in Strategy 
Strategy at Founding 
Technology race Oft 
Enhancement (E) 
Marketing/ales (M) 
Hybrid (H) 
Con(Q 
Total 
T 
41 
1 
0 
0 
0 
42 
4 )% 
£ 
0 
13 
0 
0 
0 
13 
14% 
Strategy in 1994 
M H 
0 3 
0 4 
10 2 
0 11 
2 0 
13 20 
13% 21% 
c 
0 
0 
0 
2 
5 
7 
7% 
Total 
44(47%) 
18(19%) 
12 (13%) 
13 (14%) 
7(7%) 
94 
100% 
Pearson'sX2 = 323.5.df~ l6.p < 0.001. 
model of employment. In contrast, each of the other strategies tended to 
map into only one or two of the employment models, suggesting that 
founders intending to compete by 'building a better mousetrap' did not 
agree on any particular HR recipe for doing so successfully. Another way of 
making the same point is to note that the two most common employment 
models among 'technology enhancers' account for only 62.5% of the firms 
pursuing that strategy; in contrast, the two most prevalent employment 
models capture 76.3% of the 'technological leaders', 833% of firms with a 
pure marketing-service strategy, 92.3% of firms with 'hybrid' (technology-
marketing) strategies, and 100% of firms pursuing a factory model. 
Changes in Strategy, Models and Alignment 
Business strategies, like employment systems, build commitments that are 
costly to change. Accordingly, it is interesting to examine stability in these 
organizations' strategies, employment models, and in the alignment 
between the two. First, how do the strategies employed in 1994 relate to 
those envisioned at founding? We relied on information obtained from 
interviews with CEOs (supplemented in some cases by company documents 
and archival sources) to characterize the current strategies of these companies 
in terms of the same categories used to code their founding strategies. Table 
2 shows the joint distribution of initial and current (1994) strategies for the 
94 firms for which we had the relevant information at both points in time. 
It reveals that articulated strategies have been remarkably stable: only 14 of 
the 94 enterprises (14.9%) have changed their strategies. Close examination 
of the Table reveals that 7 of the 14 changers supplemented their initial 
focus on technological leadership or enhancements in existing technology 
with a marketing or service focus, hardly a major strategic shift. Not sur-
prisingly, a few firms also moved in the opposite direction, adding a focus 
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on technology to their initial emphasis on marketing or service. Thus, only 
5 of the 94 firms (5.3%) actually abandoned their initial strategic emphasis 
altogether. 
This degree of stability was somewhat surprising because we think of the 
early years as being very turbulent. As one founder told us, 'Young firms 
have messy lives'. Moreover, these firms face highly volatile and unpredictable 
environments; one expects to see firms learning about their competencies as 
a result of early experience and learning about the competitive landscape and 
reshaping their strategic directions accordingly. Indeed, the firms in this 
sample did change some of the detailed features of their strategies, such as 
which strategic partners to pursue and which of several prototype products 
to bring to market. But when strategies are viewed abstractly, it can be seen 
that radical changes in strategic direction are extremely unusual within the 
first few years of an organization's existence. In this sense, the way a firm 
positions itself at the outset matters greatly. 
There is considerably greater evidence of change, however, in employ-
ment models between the time of found and 1994. We were able to code the 
three dimensions of employment relations (and thus the models) for both 
founders and 1994 CEOs for 70 firms in the sample, and Table 3 reports the 
joint distribution of the initial and current employment models. The fact 
that there is less stability in the employment models than in the business 
strategies is not surprising; entrepreneurs in high technology presumably 
know more about their products and markets ex ante than they know about 
an organization that they have not yet constructed and staffed. 
Note that the four blueprints for the employment relation differ greatly 
in their persistence. The factory models stands at one extreme: no firm 
moves away from this blueprint. For the intermediate cases, about a third of 
the firms whose founders began with either a commitment model or an 
engineering model had a different blueprint espoused by the CEO in 1994. 
At the other extreme, the star model was replaced in about half of the cases. 
TABLE 3 • Stability and Change in Models of the Employment Relation 
Founder's model 
Cost-minimization 
Commitment 
Scar 
Engineering 
Total 
Cost 
10 
0 
4 
3 
17 
24% 
CEOs 
Com. 
0 
15 
2 
1 
18 
26% 
model in 
Star 
0 
1 
8 
1 
10 
14% 
1994 
Eng. 
0 
6 
3 
16 
25 
36% 
Total 
10(14%) 
22 (31%) 
17 (24%) 
21(30%) 
70 
100% 
Pcaoon'i X1 - 84.9, # - 9,f < 0.001. 
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TABLE 4. Relationship of Strategy and Employment Model in 1994 
Employment model in 
Gost-minunizatioa 
Commitment 
Star 
Engineering 
Tool 
1994 
T 
8 
5 
6 
11 
30 
42% 
E 
2 
1 
1 
5 
9 
12« 
Strategy in 1994 
M H 
1 3 
7 4 
2 1 
2 7 
12 13 
17% 21% 
C 
3 
1 
0 
2 
6 
8* 
Total 
17(24*} 
18(25%) 
10(14%) 
27(37*) 
72 
100% 
Ptarwn's X2 » 18.2, ^ T= 15,/ > 0.10. 
Again, we see that initial configuration has a potentially important long-run 
effect on organizations. If these patterns turn out to hold generally, then 
rounders who begin with the factory model have placed their firms on a 
trajectory that appears very difficult to abandon. At the other extreme, the 
star and commitment models appear 'hard to reach' from other starting con-
figurations; firms that do not begin with these blueprints seem unlikely to 
evolve subsequently to them. 
Given that strategies were remarkably stable and that models of employ-
ment underwent substantial change, the overall quality (or consistency) of 
alignment has likely changed. According to Table 4, it has indeed. The 
association between the dominant business strategy and the employment 
model is much weaker in 1994 than at time of founding. Indeed, one cannot 
reject the null hypothesis of no relationship between current strategy and 
current model in Table 4 (X2 = 18.2, df = 12). This result suggests less 
apparent consistency in the match between strategy and employment model 
when firms have been in operation for several years than at the time of 
founding. We cannot rule out the possibility that the seemingly good initial 
alignment actually reflects the operation of a prior selection process. Suppose 
that alignment at inception affects survival chances strongly. Then close 
alignment would be more common among a sample of survivors than in the 
initial population of firms in. these cohorts. However, this consequence of 
selection does not appear to explain why alignment worsens over time for 
a given cohort of firms. Some potential causes and implications of this 
apparently weakening alignment between business strategy and employment 
relations are discussed below. 
5. Sources ofChange in the Employment Model 
We have posited that changes in an organization's basic employment model 
are difficult and costly to effect. What factors explain the incidence of such 
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TABLE 5. Effect of Non-founder CEO on Stability and Change in Employment Models 
A: Firms with a Founder as 
Founder's model 
Factory 
Commitment 
Star 
Engineering 
Total 
CEO in 1994 
CEOs model in 1994 
Cost Com. 
9 
0 
1 
3 
13 
29% 
0 
12 
0 
1 
13 
29% 
Star 
0 
0 
6 
0 
6 
13% 
Eng. 
0 
1 
0 
12 
13 
29% 
Total 
9(20%) 
13(29%) 
7(15%) 
16(36%) 
45 
100% 
B: Firms with a Non-Founder as CEO in 1994 
Founder's model 
Factory . 
Commitment 
Star 
Engineering 
Total 
Cost 
1 
0 
3 
0 
4 
16% 
CEO's model 
Com. 
0 
3 
2 
0 
5 
20% 
1 in 1994 
Star 
0 
1 
2 
1 
4 
16% 
Eng. 
0 
5 
3 
4 
12 
48% 
Total 
1(4%) 
9(36%) 
10(40%) 
5(20%) 
25 
100% 
Peanon's X1 - 97.1, #*= 9,p < 0.001 in Panel A. 
Peaiaon'i X2 » 12.6, Jf= 9,P > 0.10 in Panel B. 
changes? It is reasonable to expect that major changes in senior management 
might prompt changes in blueprint for employment relations. In the case of 
young companies, a particularly dramatic change is the appointment of a 
CEO from outside the ranks of the founders. In the SPEC sample, 43% of 
the CEOs in 1994 were non-founders. We would expect to find more change 
in the employment model among firms with non-fbunder-CEOs for several 
reasons. Founder-CEOs might be expected to view their organizations as 
having evolved under a consistent blueprint or vision and, accordingly, tend 
to report that senior management's model has not changed. In contrast, 
CEOs who were not founders might want to stress their stamp on the organ-
ization and thus be inclined to report that the model had changed. More-
over, CEOs from outside the founding team might be brought in by 
investors precisely with the mandate to change some of the fundamentals of 
the-organization and to rewrite some of the implicit contracts that might 
have existed previously between the firm and its employees. For these varied 
reasons, it is interesting to examine the joint distributions of initial and current 
models conditional on the status of the CEO (founder versus non-founder). 
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When the current CEO comes from the founding team, the CEO's model 
of the employment relation differs from that of the founder in only 20% of 
the cases. But when the CEO is a non-founder, the model differs about 60% 
of the time (Table 5). Should we conclude that change to a non-founder 
CEO is a critical event in shaping models of the employment relation in 
entrepreneurial firms? Perhaps. Yet, although change seems to occur more 
frequently for firms with non-founder CEOs, the pattern of change does not differ 
appreciably according to the status of the CEO in 1994. We see movement 
away from star and commitment models toward factory and engineering mod-
els in both panels of Table 5. It appears that change to non-founder CEO might 
speed the process of change, but it does not appear to dictate its direction. 
The row marginals in Table 5 reveal an interesting fact: in 1994 the likeli-
hood of the CEO coming from outside the founding team differs greatly by 
the initial employment model. In particular, more than half of the firms 
whose founders espoused star models had a non-founder CEO in 1994, and 
41% of those that began with a commitment model had non-founder CEOs. 
In contrast, only 10% of those with a factory model and 24% of those with 
an engineering model changed. Change to a non-founder CEO does not 
appear to be an exogenous shock affecting a firm's employment system; 
rather it depends partly on the founder's initial blueprint. 
Perhaps the employment models themselves generate consequences that 
lead directly to the appointment of a non-founder CEO. For instance, the 
high costs of implementing commitment and star models might create 
greater financial strains that undermine corporate performance or require 
external funding, which in turn might reduce CEO stability. On the other 
hand, these models might promote rapid growth or success (such as 
prospects for a successful IPO), making it attractive for firms to look beyond 
the set of founders for senior management appointments. 
To investigate these possibilities further, we undertook analyses of stability 
and change in models of the employment relation that control for the effects 
of age, size, industry, founder versus non-founder CEO, and other relevant 
organizational conditions. In choosing the precise measure of change in the 
employment models, we faced the constraint that the number of possible 
transitions (12) is large relative to the number of firms with complete data 
on the relevant variables (70). Because the number of observed transitions of 
any type is small, analyzing the pairwise transitions does not provide much 
useful information. We therefore decided to aggregate over origins and 
destinations in measuring change; we distinguish firms that changed their 
employment model from those that did not. We allow the models to differ 
in the propensity to change by including dummy variables for founder's 
initial model as covariates. 
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TABU 6. Effects on the Log-Odds of Changing the Employment Model (/-statistics in 
parentheses) 
Constant 
Age 
Size 
Telecom/networking 
Medical technology 
Founder employment model: 
Commitment 
Scar 
Non-founder CEO 
Full-time HR 
Change in strategy 
0) 
-0.758 
(-0.919) 
-0.016 
(-1.33) 
0.0018 
(0.749) 
-0.280 
(-0.393) 
-0.245 
(-0.327) 
0.973 
(1.41) 
1.86 
(2.26) 
(2) 
-1.77 
(-1.72) 
-0.165 
(-1.14) 
0.0021 
(0.721) 
-0.231 
(-0.277) 
-1.43 
(-1.28) 
0.678 
(0.845) 
1.89 
(192) 
2.63 
(3.64) 
(3) 
-2.38 
(-198) 
-0.162 
(-1.05) 
0.0002 
(0.048) 
-0.223 
(-0.273) 
-1.34 
(-1.20) 
0.691 
(0.845) 
1.95 
(195) 
2.48 
(338) 
1.20 
(142) 
(4) 
-3.25 
(-2.25) 
-0.198 
(-1.14) 
-0.0001 
(-0.018) 
0.061 
(0.069) 
-0.716 
(-0.606) 
0.500 
(0.598) 
1.64 
(1-57) 
2.57 
(3.29) 
2.16 
(1.89) 
2.32 
(1.72) 
Log-likelihood -38.06 -29.86 -28.80 -27.11 
Number of cases 70 70 70 70 
Number of events 21 21 21 21 
Table 6 reports the results of a set of four logit regressions. The depend-
ent variable in each is the log-odds that the CEO's employment model in 
1994 differs from the founder's model. Each specification controls for the 
effects of age in 1994, size in 1994, and industry (telecommunications and 
networking versus computers, semiconductor manufacturing, and others). 
As noted above, we also include founder's employment model on the right-
hand side. Based on the results in the cross-tabulation of founder's model by 
CEO's model in Table 5, we estimate effects for the commitment and star 
models (contrasted with the other two models). 
Not surprisingly given the retrospective design, age and size appear to be 
unrelated to change in the employment model. Similarly, industry does not 
predict change. Net of these other effects, however, the employment model 
does affect the odds of change significantly. The commitment and star models 
have substantially greater odds of being replaced. The estimated effect for 
the star model (1.86) implies that the odds of change are six times higher for 
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firms with this model (exp{1.86] = 6.42) than for those with factory and 
engineering models. Therefore, the differences among employment models 
that can be seen in the raw cross-tabulations do not appear to be an artifact 
caused by differences in age, size, or industry. 
In the second step (column 2), we consider the effect of change to a non-
founder CEO. Adding a dummy variable that equals I if the CEO in 1994 is 
a non-founder improves the fit of the model significantly (compare the likeli-
hoods in columns 1 and 2). Firms with non-founder CEOs have much 
greater odds of changing the model of employment (net of the effects of age, 
size, industry and founder model). Adding the strong effect of non-founder 
CEO actually increases the strength of the effects of the star model. Initial 
conditions persist in the race of the very large shock of moving outside the 
founding team for a CEO. 
The third and fourth columns in Table 6 report the results of adding 
additional effects to the model. The additional covariates are two dummy 
variables, one which distinguishes firms that had hired a full-time human 
resources manager between founding and 1994, and another which indicates 
firms that had changed their business strategy. Both variables have large 
positive effects; however, neither addition improves the fit significantly over 
the simpler specification in the second column. Nonetheless, we find it 
intriguing that appointment of a full-time HR manager has a positive and 
significant effect on the likelihood of changing models. This result conforms 
to the view that HR managers come to firms with fixed agendas that might 
not be responsive to the firm's business context. If so, then professional HR 
management might be partly responsible for undermining the alignment 
between employment models and business strategies observed (retro-
spectively) at founding. In the conclusion we return to the issue of why this 
alignment appears to diminish over time. 
6. Founders' Models and Subsequent Developments 
Our companion paper (Baron et at., 1966) presented evidence that tenta-
tively supports the view that a founder's employment model constrains sub-
sequent evolution of human resource policies and practices. But what about 
broader effects of internal business strategies and employment models on 
organizational evolution? This section examines the effects of initial employ-
ment models and business strategies on two important changes in the evolu-
tion of young, entrepreneurial firms: the appointment of a CEO from 
outside the ranks of the founders and making the transition from private to 
public ownership (successfully completing an IPO). 
Inertia and Change in the Early Yean 
i ' • I ' ' I I I I 1 1 1 1 
"0 10 20 30 40 SO 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130 140 
Age (months) 
FIGURE 1. Cumulative hazard function: appointment of first non-founder CEO. 
Change to a Non-founder CEO 
We noted above that the appointment of a non-founder CEO is an occasion 
for major restructuring. We found that this event increases substantially the 
likelihood of change in senior management's espoused blueprint for the 
employment relation. Yet there was also evidence in Table 5 of an associa-
tion between he founder's employment model and the likelihood that a non-
founder serves as CEO in 1994. In this section, we investigate the possibility 
that the founder's model affects this transition directly. We do this in analyses 
that control for some of the other observable causal influences, including 
aging, growth, and industry. 
We make use of the fact that we obtained the exact timing of the 
appointment of the first non-founder CEO. The methods of event-history 
analysis (Tuma and Hannan, 1984) are used to estimate effects of covariates 
on the rate of first transition (from founder to non-founder CEO). We specify 
the underlying process in terms of organizational age (/). That is, we regard 
each firm as becoming at risk of the appointment of a non-founder CEO at 
birth; and we analyze the (right-censored) distribution of age at the time of 
such appointment. 
Let Yk(t) denote the state of one of the qualitative processes of interest, 
with state space: Y(t) = 0, 1. In the case at hand, let Y(t) = 0 indicate that 
only founders have served as CEO by age / and Y(t) = 1 indicate that a non-
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founder serves as CEO at age /. Then, the hazard of shifting to a non-CEO 
founder is defined as: 
ux .. Pr{Y(t+da)=l\Y(t) = 0) . K')= bm r- , / > 0 . 
Mo A/ 
We summarize the (unconditional) age-variation in the rate with the (transi-
tion-specific) cumulative hazard function: 
H(t) = f0f(u)du 
Figure 1 plots the estimated cumulative hazard function for this event. The 
slope of the function tangent to this estimated function over any reasonably 
small interval approximates the underlying rate. It appears from this plot 
that the rate is low for young organizations and becomes higher, but variably 
so, at older ages. 
In building models that incorporate heterogeneity among firms, we tried 
several specifications of age dependence, using both piecewise constant and 
parametric specifications. The best fits come from a Weibull model. The 
parameterization of the Weibull model that we estimate has the form.13 
K / ) = ^ / * _ 1 , / > 0 , (1) 
a - expOc'flL), (2) 
b = exp(*'£),' (3) 
where r{t) denotes the rate of moving to non-founder CEO for firm / at age /, 
in months and x, is a vector of covariates. (The log-linear relationships in (2) 
and (3) are useful because the transition rate must be non-negative.) In 
general, the covariates vary with age for each organization. Time variation in 
covariates are accommodated by the standard method of 'spell splitting', 
which breaks each firm's history into monthly subspells and updates the values 
of the covariates at the beginning of each subspell (Tuma and Hannan, 1984; 
Blossfeid and Rohwer, 1995). The number of spells in this analysis are the 
number of observed firm-months throughout the lifetime of each company. 
Table 7 reports maximum likelihood estimates of the effects of various 
covariates on the rate of first transition to non-founder CEO.14 As was the 
case for change in the model of employment, size and age have negligible 
effects. Both effects (the effect of size in the 'a-vector' and the constant repre-
senting the effect of pure aging in the 'b-vector') are statistically non-significant. 
The effects of the two industrial categories and ownership status (public versus 
private) are also non-significant. 
11
 Henceforth, we suppress the subscripts indexing the origin and destination Kates. These should be 
dear in the context of each analysis. 
14
 We used TDA (Rohwer, 1994) to estimate this and subsequent event-history models. 
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TABLE 7. Effects on Races of Transition to a Non-
founder CEO (f-statistics in parentheses) 
A-vector 
Constant 
Sin 
Tekcom/Nerworking 
Medical Technology 
Founder employment model: 
Commitment 
Star 
Engineering 
Founder strategy: 
Technology race 
Marketing/Service 
Public company 
B-Vector 
Constant 
Log-liklihnod 
Number of spells 
Number of events 
- 6 . 1 9 
(-8.56) 
0.010 
(0.569) 
0.406 
(1.24) 
-0 .382 
(-1.07) 
1.24 
(184) 
2.15 
(306) 
0.748 
(107) 
0.504 
(1.70) 
-0 .981 
(-196) 
0.016 
(0.039) 
0.176 
(1.27) 
-265.30 
7193 
39 
See text for explanation of the 'a-vector' and t»-vector'. 
Table 7 documents that the founders' models of employment relations 
significantly afreet rates of appointment of a non-founder CEO. The com-
mitment, engineering, and star models of employment have higher transi-
tion rates than the (excluded) factory model. If the factory model stands at 
one extreme, the star model stands at the other. The estimates in Table 7 
imply that the transition rate for firms with star model founders is approxi-
mately 8.5 (exp{2.15) — 8.58) higher than for firms with factory model 
founders (conditional on the covariates). This difference in rates for star and 
factory models is highly significant. The difference between he commitment 
and factory models is also large (the ratio of the rates is approximately 3) and 
this difference is significant at the 0.10 level. 
Initial business strategies also have substantial and statistically significant 
effects on the rate. Firms whose initial strategy placed primary emphasis on 
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competing by superior marketing and service, where continuity presumably 
matters for maintaining partnerships with customers, were much less likely 
to see the appointment of a non-founder CEO. In contrast, firms engaged at 
the start in a technology race were more likely to experience this event. 
These effects of employment model on founder-CEO persistence shed a 
different light on the instability of the star and commitment models. The 
high likelihood that these models will be changed appears to reflect at least 
partly the effect of these models on the persistence of a founder as CEO. In 
other words, the star and commitment models tend not to persist because 
founders with these models are likely to be replaced with non-founders. We 
suspect that the impermanence of founder leadership in firms begun with 
star and commitment models has something to do with implicit contracts. 
Neither the factory model nor the engineering model implies any implicit 
long-term contract between the firm and its employees. However, a star 
system typically involves implicit contracts that give very strong control 
over strategic directions in technology development to the technical stars. 
And a commitment system involves extensive implicit contracts with all 
classes of workers that they be treated as 'family'. We think that these con-
tracts are typically thought to bind the founders. If the founders come to 
symbolize the cultures reflected in these implicit contracts, then it is diffi-
cult to change features of the employment relation as long as founders 
remain at the helm. Change might then require that an outside be brought 
in as chief executive. 
Completion of an Initial Public Offering 
Many founders report that their initial business plans called for their firms 
to become public companies at some point. Succeeding in going public is an 
important concern in many—if not most—young, high technology firms. 
Such firms frequently offer inexpensive 'founders' stock' and/or options to 
purchase the firm's stock on favorable terms at a future date to some—if not 
all—early hires. Both types of compensation are largely illiquid unless a 
firm becomes a public company. Not surprisingly, completion of an initial 
public offering (IPO) is widely regarded as an early sign of success in the Sil-
icon Valley business community. Nearly a third of the firms in the SPEC 
sample had completed an initial public offering by mid-1994. In this 
section, we explore whether the rate of IPO depends upon the firm's initial 
conditions, specifically on the founder's strategy and model of the employ-
ment relation. 
Because we know the exact timing of IPOs, we again use the method of 
event-history analysis. Figure 2 summarizes the age variation in the rate of 
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FlGUM 2. Cumulative hazaid function: initial public offering. 
IPO. The pattern differs considerably from that found for appointment of a 
non-founder CEO. Very few firms experienced an IPO within their first 
three years. 
Again, we tried several specifications of age dependence in this analysis, 
using both piecewise constant and parametric specifications. In this case, the 
best fits come from a specification that breaks age into pieces and estimates a 
constant for each age segment. Let Tf indicate the time (age) of the start of 
the^th segment, with T0 = 0. The models we estimate have the form: 
r(t)« expfr/a) exp(<J>p, f e(T,,T,+,), f>0. 
We use three age segments: (0-35 months, 36-71 months, and 72 or more 
months). Again, we use the method of 'spell splitting' (by month of age) to 
update the values of time-varying covariates. 
The empirical specifications used resemble those already discussed in the 
previous analyses. Table 8 reports the relevant results. As expected from 
examining Figure 2, the rate of going public is very low for the first three 
years. The rate is substantially higher over the rest of the age range, and the 
tares differ little for the second and third segments. These results suggest 
that these firms have little chance of undergoing an IPO for the first three 
years or so. The transition rate jumps and remains nearly constant over age 
from that point. 
Again, we find that employment size does not affect the rate. However, 
industry does: firms in telecommunications, networking, medical technol-
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ogy and biotechnology have substantially higher rates of going public than 
those in the excluded set (computer industry, semiconductor industry and 
other industries). The difference is statistically significant for the telecom-
munications/networking industry in both specifications in Table 8 and for 
medical technology/biotechnology in one of them. 
The founder's model of employment has a surprisingly strong impact on 
the rate of IPO. The rates for the three included models are much higher 
than for the excluded factory model. The difference is large and statistically 
significant for the star and commitment models. Holding constant age, size, 
and industry, firms whose founders had star or commitment models go pub-
lic at roughly 10 times the rate of firms whose founders had a factory model. 
Further research is needed to clarify the mechanism(s) that produce a re-
lationship between employment models and rates of IPO. Several possible 
mechanisms seem plausible. The relationship might stem from the logic of 
initial organization. For instance, our companion paper (Baron et al., 1996) 
shows that firms founded on star models are more likely than others to grant 
stock options to employees, which creates a strong internal demand for an 
early IPO. Alternatively, employment models might directly affect chances 
of early success. That is, firms built on star and commitment models might 
develop differently in ways that make the firms especially attractive to out-
side investors, thereby enhancing opportunities for an IPO. An additional 
possibility is that the star and commitment models are costly models. Firm 
adoption of one of these models is actually a proxy for slack resources com-
manded by the founder which may be related to later ability to go public. 
We intend to pursue these different alternative explanations in future 
research. 
Initial business strategy also affects the rate of going public. Exploration 
of various specifications revealed that two strategies—the technology race 
and marketing/service strategies—differ most strongly from the rest. We 
include dummy variables that distinguish these two strategies from he com-
bined set of other strategies (technology enhancement, hybrid and cost). 
With this set of contrasts, firms that began by entering a technology race 
had significantly higher rates of going public and those with a 
marketing/service strategy had lower rates (but not significantly so). 
The second column of Table 8 adds an effect of status of the CEO (non-
founder versus founder). The results show that the rate of IPO for firms 
whose current GSO is not a founder was nearly triple that of firms that 
stayed with founder top management. This difference in transition rates is 
highly significant. We also see that controlling for the status of the CEO 
weakens the effects of the star and commitment models. This is to be 
expected, given that we have already seen that CEO/founder status is power-
Inertia and Change in the Early Yean 
TABU 8. Effects on Rates of Initial Public 
Offering (/-statistics in parentheses) 
Age segment ( ^ 
0-3$ months 
36-71 months 
72 months or more 
Size 
Telecom/Networking 
Medical technology 
Founder employment model: 
Commitment 
Star 
Engineering 
Founder strategy: 
Technology race 
Marketing/Service 
Non-founder CEO 
Log-likelihood 
Number of spelb 
Number of events 
(1) 
-10 .7 
(-8.82) 
-8 .31 
(-8.22) 
- 7 . 8 0 
(-7.76) 
0.010 
(4.35) 
1.05 
(2.19) 
0.696 
(1.31) 
2.35 
(2.56) 
2.52 
(2.73) 
1.04 
(1.18) 
1.22 
(2.61) 
-1-23 
(-1.61) 
-210.52 
7193 
31 
(2) 
- 1 0 . 4 
( -8.58) 
- 8 . 2 0 
(-8.18) 
-7 .72 
(-7.75) 
0.010 
(4.47) 
0.902 
(181) 
1.05 
(1.97) 
1.68 
(1.77) 
1.69 
(174) 
0545 
(0.610) 
1.21 
(2.56) 
-0 .702 
(-0.911) 
109 
(2.65) 
-207 .0 
7193 
31 
fully affected by these models of employment. That is, controlling for status 
of the CEO is tantamount to controlling for one of the consequences of the 
initial models. This pair of results suggests a tendency for firms whose 
founders had star or commitment models to acquire non-founder CEOs in 
the process of becoming public companies. Very often this means bringing 
in seasoned managers to take the helm of firms that were founded and man-
aged initially by engineers or scientists. It might also mean renegotiating 
implicit contracts about employment, as we discussed above. 
7. Conclusions 
Before assessing progress toward unraveling the causes of 'lock-in* in organ-
izations, we repeat the cautions raised at the outset. Although the data 
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gathered in the first phase of SPEC provide unusual detail on the early histories 
of organizing and of crafting employment relations, they are less than ideal. 
The main limitation is that we are analyzing a sample of survivors, albeit 
survivors over a reasonably short time span. Moreover, we base our con-
clusions on a relatively small number of events. The panel study, once com-
pleted (in five years or so), will provide much more dependable information 
about the main questions addressed here. 
Having stated these cautions, we think that this first glimpse at the histo-
ries of many young, high technology firms suggests that initial conditions 
matter a great deal, even within the turbulent early years. We find the per-
vasive impart of the founder's blueprint for the employment relation both 
surprising and impressive. We did not expect to find that the founder's 
employment model would affect rates of change in top management, success 
in going public, and establishment and elaboration of formal human 
resources management. This range of effects, along with their strength, 
makes us want to delve more deeply into these matters. 
An especially intriguing finding reported in this paper is that the close 
alignment between business strategies and HR models at the time of found-
ing had completely vanished by 1994, when these firms were studied. There 
are a number of explanations for this provocative result. One obvious possi-
bility is that close alignment is easier to achieve in the early years because 
start-ups are more homogeneous than older, larger firms with respect to 
their tasks and labor forces, thereby enabling start-ups to construct a single 
employment system or governance regime that envelops most or all of the 
employees. To put it differently, with growth in the scale, complexity, and 
heterogeneity of their tasks and employees, transaction cost economizing in 
a firm's employment system may occur at ever-lower levels of aggregation, 
rather than at the level of the organization as a whole or major subunits with 
it. 
If this is true, a worthwhile question for future research is whether specific 
business strategies and/or employment models are more or less flexible in 
coping with this transition. One might expect, for instance, that firms in 
which the employment relationship is initially conceptualized and struc-
tured in terms of the star or factory models might be able to cope with these 
pressures toward internal differentiation more easily than firms that adopt 
the commitment model at their inception. Similarly, one might imagine 
that firms pursuing a strategy of technology leadership view key technical 
personnel as their major competitive asset, adopting particular HR policies 
and practices designed to attract, nurture, and retain those individuals, but 
displaying less regard for individuals engaged in other domains of activity 
(e.g. manufacturing, marketing) by virtue of the firms anticipated technical 
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monopoly. In contrast, firms seeking to enhance an existing technology are 
likely to need to coordinate their technical core more closely with other 
functional areas of the firm, which may push them in the direction of 
adopting employment policies that are more consistent throughout the 
organization. 
In addition, there may be particular types of firms and strategies for 
which the evolutionary trend is in the opposite direction—that is, toward 
more consistent treatment among different segments of the organization 
over time. For instance, companies founded around a strategy of technology 
leadership may find, once their initial success attracts the attention of com-
petitors, that they need closer integration between technical personnel and 
those engaged in manufacturing and/or marketing their products, and that 
this is impeded by an organizational culture and HR system that has tradi-
tionally treated the latter as second-class citizens. 
We are excited by the long-term prospects for examining these issues in 
more depth once we have gathered panel data on the SPEC firms. We con-
clude by outlining some of the next steps in this program of research. The 
second phase of the study, currently nearing completion, adds information 
on another 75 firms with the same profile. We have managed to find many 
younger firms in the second stage (as we have improved our ability to iden-
tify possible target firms). Using data from the second phase, we can validate 
our coding of employment models and business strategies and also check on 
the robustness of the patterns described in this (and the companion) paper. 
Then, combining the data from the two phases, we will gain enough statisti-
cal power to conduct more refined analyses of imprinting. For instance, we 
can compare patterns of relationships over the first few years of age for the 
older and younger firms in the sample. Such comparisons will allow us to 
assess the importance of survivor bias in affecting our results. 
The most interesting possibilities lie in analyses of the planned panel 
data. Once we have made repeated observations on the firms in the sample, 
we will be in a position to test more interesting specifications of various 
imprinting stories. This is because we will be able to estimate the effect of 
origins on outcomes at time 2 (and subsequent times) controlling for the 
observed structures and practices in mid-1994. If imprinting has relevance 
to employment relations in these high technology firms, we ought not to be 
able to eliminate the effects of origins on outcomes by controlling in a very 
detailed manner for the history of the firm to the time of our first waves of 
observations. Such analyses promise to shed the clearest light yet on pro-
cesses of organizational imprinting. 
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